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Abstract. The recent UK Supreme Court case Lucasfilm v. Ainsworth has highlighted the 
complexities of enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in the UK. This note explores the 
substantive points argued in those proceedings before briefly commenting on the procedural issues 
encountered. Finally, it suggests that a specialist dispute resolution forum external to the court 
structure could expedite dispute resolution and improve access to justice. 
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1. Introduction 
Jurists readily recognise that rights granted without effective means of enforcement are not rights at all; and this 
truism holds good as much for property rights as for civil rights. As a consequence, the true value of rights, and 
particularly those pertaining to property ‘ownership’, lies not just in the formulated rights themselves but in the 
facility with which the legal system offers an accessible and appropriate system for their assertion, access to 
justice, and enforcement. This is no less the case for Intellectual Property (IP) rights which are commonly 
overlaid with the added complication of an international jurisdictional dimension so that any consideration of IP 
rights necessarily synthesises the ‘local’ with the ‘global’ and the ‘substantive’ with the ‘procedural’ as 
illustrated by the recent UK Supreme Court judgment in Lucasfilm Limited and others (Appellants) v. Ainsworth 
[2011] UKSC 39 (hereafter ‘Lucasfilm’).  In that case, in order to apply copyright protection, the Supreme Court 
judges had to clarify not only a ‘simple’ statutory definition, but also the extent of foreign jurisdictional ‘reach’ - 
thereby conjoining substantive law and legal rights with domestic legal systemic issues. 
  
The purpose of this short paper is to focus upon those issues; to recognise the systemic challenges and 
hurdles encountered in upholding and enforcing substantive legal rights; to distinguish those systemic challenges 
and hurdles from those specifically encountered in upholding substantive intellectual property rights; and finally 
to draw out of the Supreme Court judgments some basic systemic adjustments capable of reinforcing access to 
justice in the context of intellectual property rights. This paper will start by summarising the facts and legal 
issues raised in the case, before proceeding to comment briefly on the judgments. Such brief commentary offers 
neither a procedural paradigm nor a prescription of best policy or practice; but it does offer itself as a modest 
contribution to initiate, and as an initial contribution to, a wider discussion between interested parties 
(individuals, organisations, and governments) and to inform the subsequent formulation of legislation, policy and 
process. It does not claim to address all issues or to offer universal solutions: but it does highlight the imperative 
that whilst IP enjoys many unique facets, it is not so different from its juristic cousins. It does assert that an 
effective and maintained systemic legal access to justice predicates respect for the substantive legal rights, not 
least those pertaining to IP. 
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2.  Lucasfilm in the Supreme Court 
Copyright law aims to maintain a balance between, on the one hand, the exclusive protection in favour of the 
proprietor of the IP right to exploit the work and, on the other hand,  allowing others to reproduce the work as 
part of ‘fair dealing’. Also in this balance lie financial interests and potential financial (and fiscal) advantages 
flowing from successful commercial exploitation.  Globalisation has extended the available markets for the 
designs, but also the possible jurisdictional battlefields of IP protection as the facts and arguments in Lucasfilm 
reveal.  
 
The case concerned the IP rights in an Imperial Stormtrooper helmet made for use in the first Star Wars film 
released in 1977– subsequently known as “Star Wars Episode IV – A New Hope”. George Lucas created the 
film’s story-line and its characters including the ‘threatening’ Imperial Stormtrooper in “fascist white armoured 
suits”. Ralph McQuarrie expressed them in two dimensional drawings and paintings and Andrew Ainsworth took 
them into three-dimensional form as vacuum-moulded helmets. It was accepted that the Lucasfilm (the 
appellants) owned the copyright in the ‘artistic works created for the Star Wars films’ and enjoyed considerable 
commercial success in licensing models, including those of Imperial Stormtroopers whose helmets had become 
iconic. Mr Ainsworth recognised this success and in 2004, using his original tools, made for sale to the public, 
versions of the Imperial Stormtrooper helmet estimated to be worth up to $30,000 in the United States. Such 
actions attracted the attention of Lucasfilm who initiated proceedings in the UK under the Copyright Designs 
and Patents Act 1988 (the Act) in addition to proceedings to enforce in the UK an order of a US court. At first 
instance, Mann J dismissed all Lucasfilm’s claims based on UK copyright law.  
3. Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988   
The relevant UK copyright law is the Act which aims to protect artistic work; and at first instance, Mann J. was 
asked to determine whether the helmets fell within that definition. His Lordship observed that:  
 
“One of the most abiding images in the film was that of the Imperial  
Stormtroopers. These were soldiers clad in white armour, including a  
white helmet which left no part of the face uncovered... The purpose  
of the helmet was that it was to be worn as an item of costume in a  
film, to identify a character, but in addition to portray something  
about that character – its allegiance, force, menace, purpose and, to  
some extent, probably its anonymity. It was a mixture of costume  
and prop.” ([2008] EWHC 1878 (Ch), at paras [2] and [121]). 
 
If the helmet were to be a “sculpture”, its copying of the helmets would infringe Lucasfilm’s copyright. 
Lucasfilm contended that the helmet had no practical function at all, but was ‘wholly artistic, to make a visual 
impression on the filmgoer’. His Lordship saw the helmets as a substantial reproduction of original works 
executed for Lucasfilm, but that they expressed ‘an idea as part of character portrayal in the film’ (and, so, 
fulfilled a primarily utilitarian function). His Lordship had held that the helmet was not protected as it lacked 
‘the necessary quality of artistic creation required of a sculpture’. 
 
Before the UK Supreme Court, Lucasfilm’s claim was again expressed as a claim that the helmets 
(irrespective of the degree of artistic quality) qualified for copyright protection under English law as “sculptures” 
in which copyright was capable of subsisting under section 4 of the Act. If the Supreme Court found the helmets 
to be ‘sculptures’, copying by Mr Ainsworth (even though it had been he who had created the three dimensional 
form) would have infringed Lucasfilm’s copyright; but if it found it not to be a sculpture (and, so, not a “work of  
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artistic craftsmanship”), by virtue of section 51,  there would be no protection available against infringement of 
the design or even of Mr McQuarrie’s copyright in the original two dimensional design document. In the case, 
this analysis crystallised the question before the Supreme Court as simply whether the definition of “sculpture” 
extended to a three-dimensional object having ‘both an artistic purpose and a utilitarian function’ as had the asset 
in contemplation (the helmet).  
 
Mindful of Lord Hoffmann’s dicta in Designers Guild Ltd v Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd ([2000] 1 WLR 
2416) the courts should not hurry to depart from that nature of ‘judgmental conclusion’, the Supreme Court 
agreed with both the High Court and Court of Appeal, and decided that whilst the term ‘sculpture’ was capable 
of extension, the definition was not susceptible of excessive extension from its usual meaning; that not every 
three dimensional  representation of a concept qualifies; and that, so, the helmet was not a sculpture. The 
rationale was that the law applied a multi-factorial approach: as the term “sculpture” would not normally be 
applied to a 20th century military helmet used in a film, ‘however great its contribution to the artistic effect of 
the finished film’, it could not be applied to an ‘Imperial Stormtrooper helmet’. Notwithstanding that the film 
had become a ‘the work of art’, the helmet remained merely an element in the process of the film’s production 
and therefore utilitarian. 
4. US proceedings 
The second assertion of the Lucasfilm before the Supreme Court was that an English court could exercise 
jurisdiction in a claim against persons domiciled in England for infringement of US copyright. The broad 
principle remained that the English courts generally accepted that sovereignty extends over a state’s own 
nationals and those finding themselves in its jurisdiction. This lack of any limitation on the territorial extent of an 
Act of Parliament was famously exemplified by Sir Ivor Jennings in 1959:  'If [Parliament] enacts that smoking 
in the streets of Paris is an offence, then it is an offence'. Conversely in Mortensen v Peters (1906) 8 F (J) 93, 
Lord Salvesen questioned whether the British Parliament would pass legislation to impose an obligation upon 
British fishermen and not to extend it to foreigners within UK waters: "I think ... if legislation of this nature had 
been proposed ...it would never have been submitted by a responsible minister or have received the approval of 
Parliament."  
 
As a foreign court would not enforce UK laws, the corollary remained that UK courts would refuse to 
enforce judgments of foreign courts (but not to ignore the issues raised). In Lucasfilm this issue of jurisdictional 
reach had direct importance specifically in copyright litigation. The High Court had accepted that US copyright 
had been infringed and that the United States’ copyright claims were justiciable a view rejected by the Court of 
Appeal. 
 
Part of the difficulty is that the creation of a modern film is rarely mono-jurisdictional. Although George 
Lucas and his corporations were based in the USA, and some filming had taken place in Tunisia, the fashioning 
of the early clay models and vacuum moulding of the helmets had occurred in England. When the Lucasfilm 
sought to enforce in the UK the order already obtained in the USA, Mann J held that US copyright claims were 
justiciable in England; and moreover that as Mr Ainsworth had infringed those rights, an extra-territorial 
injunction could be granted in the British courts against him subject to his being liable to in personam 
jurisdiction. 
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal recognized that the modern trend favours the enforcement of foreign 
intellectual property rights, although distinguishing the blind enforcement of an order of a foreign court from the 
recognition (and enforcement) of foreign rights through litigation in UK courts. In this approach it affirmed that 
there was no reason for the English court refusing to take jurisdiction over an English defendant in a claim for 
breach of foreign copyright even though there was no international regime for the mutual recognition of 
copyright jurisdiction and of copyright judgments.  The question to be addressed was formulated as:  
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‘Whether an English court may exercise jurisdiction in a claim against persons domiciled in 
England for infringement of copyright committed outside the European Union in breach of the 
copyright law of that country?’  
 
The Supreme Court acknowledged British courts’ endeavours to avoid conflict with foreign jurisdictions and 
distinguished many of the the leading cases as having  ‘involved unusual factual situations in which the claim 
had major political ramifications’ such as in Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd [1979] AC 
508. In that case (which related to the hotels in Turkish Federated State of North Cyprus ) Lord Wilberforce 
identified the problems of “possible conflict with foreign jurisdictions, and the possible entry into and 
involvement with political questions of some delicacy.”  
 
It was widely recognised that UK courts were reluctant to adjudicate on matters previously considered to be 
non-justiciable, such as “the transactions of foreign sovereign states” (Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) 
([1982] AC 888, at 931) all of which would be inconsistent with international law. In British South Africa Co v 
Companhia de Moçambique ([1893] AC 602) the courts were faced with determining  the competing claims of a 
Portuguese company (with substantial British ownership) effectively in control of Mozambique and Cecil 
Rhodes’ British South Africa Co over mines in territories which were claimed by Portugal: but that should be 
distinguished from exercising jurisdiction in personam where the party was in jurisdiction. Moreover, European 
legislation (e.g. Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations) showed there to be no public policy against bringing litigation in 
Member States for infringement of foreign copyright.  
 
In the Supreme Court, Lord Mance agreed with the reasons given by Lord Walker and Lord Collins that the 
appeal failed on the first issue (sculpture) and succeeded on the second (i.e. justiciability of a claim for 
infringement of a foreign copyright) but offered a separate judgment expressing no view about the application or 
scope of the doctrine of act of state in relation to issues of validity of foreign intellectual property rights which 
(unlike copyright) may be said to depend upon state grant. 
5. Analysis of the judgments 
The judgments produced no great surprises. The Lucasfilm’s claim to exercise copyright over the helmets made 
for the film had been founded on two distinct bases. Firstly on the application of (UK) domestic legislation and 
secondly on the application (in the UK) of an extant US court order. Whilst sharing a common objective of 
controlling the respondent’s exploitation of the design of the helmets, these two bases engage fundamentally 
different principles and issues. 
 
Before the Supreme Court the domestic law question had been reduced to whether the helmet constituted a 
‘sculpture’ for the purposes of the domestic legislation. The five judges delivered an agreed and clear view: 
notwithstanding that the film had become a ‘work of art’, the Stormtrooper Helmet remained merely an element 
in the process of the film’s production and therefore merely utilitarian, failing to satisfy the relevant criteria (for 
being a sculpture), and so to enjoy copyright protection under the 1988 Act. The second issue - of international 
jurisdiction - had proved more engaging; but the judicial reluctance to enforce a foreign judgment had been 
tempered by the acceptance of the justiciability of a claim for a breach of foreign copyright, were one to be 
presented in the UK courts.  
5.1 Lessons learnt? 
The first (domestic) question followed the nature of many cases before the Supreme Court – that of statutory 
interpretation. Absent a written constitution in the United Kingdom, the most important and difficult aspect of  
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statute law is concerned with interpretation. In Johnson v Moreton [1980] AC 37, Lord Hailsham LC observed 
that nine-tenths of all cases reaching the House of Lords turned on statutory interpretation; and that role remains 
for its successor, the Supreme Court. So, the statutory interpretation triggered in Lucasfilm can hardly be 
described as atypical or abnormal. Of greater interest, and importance, was the perceived need to litigate up to 
the Supreme Court over the apparently clear qualifying test for protection under the 1988 Act. The helmets were 
stated to be worth up to $30,000 – a figure certainly dwarfed by the costs of the litigation (including those of 
exceptional commercial counsel) and also hearings extending over several weeks in 2008, 2009, and 2011. One 
must question whether such an expensive process could be eased?  
 
Secondly, the time-frame of such litigation is excessive. The seven years from the original ‘alleged 
infringement’ to a final judgment inhibited progress and the corollary is that it could have allowed an 
unscrupulous infringer to irreparably damage through adverse exploitation the value of the design whose 
protection was being litigated. Criticisms of the cost, delay, and uncertainty of litigation – whether seeking 
private or commercial justice - are not new. Michael Napier’s Gresham Lecture ‘Access to Justice: Keeping the 
doors open’ explored the ‘various doors that need to be located, and then opened, if people are to gain access to 
justice.’  He recognised that “those who seek access to justice need to know how to negotiate the route” and 
drew on Charles Dickens’ Bleak House, for criticism of the cost of litigation:  
 
'London 1853.  Michaelmas term lately over... This is the Court of Chancery... which gives to 
monied might the means abundantly of wearying out the right, which so exhausts finances, 
patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart, that there is not an 
honourable man among its practitioners who would not give - who does not often give - the 
warning 'suffer any wrong that can be done rather than come here!'.  
 
 
Furthermore, the issues and technicalities triggered by the global reach of IP protection seem to facilitate 
progressive appeals to the highest courts.  
That the appeal progressed so far can be explained by the inclusion of Lucasfilm’s claim to enforce in the 
UK a US court order. But the existence of such US court order and the UK’s failure to ensure prompt and 
effective application are indicative of the practical inadequacies of the litigation process and international 
protection afforded to IP. 
5.2 A clear definitive interpretative body 
 
In formulating any legislative regime, the temptation is to identify and define the special features: and this, in 
major part, is the Act’s approach to substantive IP. Without denying the validity of yielding to such temptation in 
many cases, the present writer suggests that the innovative and developing nature of IP warrants and necessitates 
an internationally compatible and recognised regulatory and dispute resolution body.  It is noteworthy that 
mediaeval mercantile activity enjoyed success due, in no small part, to the support and dispute resolution 
mechanisms afforded by the Mercantile Guilds in respect of commercial and industrial designs; and disputes 
over what are now known as IP were readily resolved within, and by, the Guilds. Into the vacuum created by the 
decline of the Guilds came statute (such as the Copyright Act, 1709), but its principal objective was to protect 
the written (published) word (and later engravings and musical and dramatic compositions) and its exploitation 
and enjoyment by publishers, and only incidentally were such provisions used to control unlicensed publications. 
In the context of Lucasfilm, it was the Sculpture Copyright Act 1814 which had clarified the protection accorded 
to sculpture – defined as “any new and original sculpture, or model, or copy, or cast of the human figure or 
human figures, or of any bust or busts, or of any part or parts of the human figure, clothed in drapery or 
otherwise.” 
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6. Conclusion 
The fundamental thesis behind this paper is that rights granted without effective means of enforcement are not 
rights at all; and it is suggested that having to fight to the highest court to assert a right fails that primordial test. 
The consequence is that formulation of IP without a legal system offering effective access to justice fails IP – it 
is no more than a glass without contents. Moreover, in today’s globalised market, IP has to be viewed as a global 
issue and any consideration of IP rights necessarily has to synthesise the ‘local’ with the ‘global’, and the 
‘substantive’ with the ‘procedural’. In Lucasfilm, the common objective of controlling the one party’s 
exploitation of the design of the helmets, engaged fundamentally different principles and issues which 
immediately exemplify the domestic and international scope and impact of IP protection.  It is a moot point 
whether the UK Supreme Court would have evidenced equal reluctance to enforce the US court order if the US 
and UK principles been fully aligned. It is suggested therefore that if IP continues to use common terminology in 
a precise manner, those organisations and individuals engaged in IP take steps towards developing 
internationally accepted ‘portable’ definitions or provide a dispute resolution forum -  (one hesitates to christen it 
‘a tribunal’) to offer internationally recognised and respected interpretation and definitions to enhance 
confidence in IP. 
 
Litigation, particularly over IP rights, risks inhibiting innovative exploitation and progression.  Moreover, 
whilst IP litigation is often characterised as a dispute between large commercial enterprises, Lucasfilm 
demonstrated that ‘small players’ can frequently be involved. Unlike state interest litigation (such as taxation 
where the state may seek guidance on a small incident to support a broader application) one must question 
whether any legal system should indulge litigants over a comparatively small value in taking matters to the 
highest courts.  Lucasfilm clearly shows the need for a manageable mechanism for dispute resolution – a key to 
the door of justice.   
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